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Abstract 
 
Using unbalanced panel data for the sample period 2002-2012, this study investigates the 
relation between macroeconomic factors and the capital structure of 233 Swedish companies. 
Using the Random Effects model, this paper identifies the macroeconomic determinants that 
affect the capital structure of Swedish firms. We find that the leverage measures are positively 
related to the GDP Growth rate, Interest rate, Banking Credit as percentage of GDP ratio and 
the Stock price performance, while the Inflation rate has a negative effect on the leverage. 
This paper also provides evidence that banking sector is important for the Swedish firms. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Firms’ capital structure is considered one of the most discussed topics in the field of finance. 
The capital structure theory is still raising interesting debates related to Myers’s (1984: p. 
575) question: “How do firms choose their capital structure?” It’s fair to say that after 30 
years, there is no complete consensus around this issue since it is complicated to come up 
with a clear and objective answer to this important and controversial question.  
 
This could be explained by the fact that the optimal amount of debt in the capital structure is 
highly subjective to the industry, the legal system, the accounting regulations, the tax policy 
and other elements that differentiate one country from another. Recognizing that the crucial 
choice of the firms’ capital structure has multidimensional characteristics, it is easier to 
understand the reason why Myers’s question does not have one single and objective answer.  
  
According to the findings of previous empirical studies, the strategic decision of a particular 
capital structure is affected by firm specific and macroeconomic factors (Hackbarth, D., Miao, 
J., and Morellec, E., (2006), Antoniou, A., Guney, Y., and Paudyal, K., (2008), Antoniou, A., 
Guney, Y., and Paudyal, K. (2002), Mokhova, N., Zinecker M., (2014). However, as it is 
demonstrated later on this paper, there is not a clear picture of the direction of impact of these 
factors on the firms’ capital structure. Considering that the impact of firm-specific factors can, 
to some extent, be managed by the managers, the majority of related studies utilize firm-
specific variables as determinants of capital structure.  
 
However, the importance of the macroeconomic factors cannot be neglected. “In the 
economic and financially integrated world of today, no company can remain unaffected by 
what happens in the world economy. Thus, interconnectedness places new demands on 
company management to consider the connection between their own company’s development 
and changes in the company’s macroeconomic environment” Oxelheim (1999: p.66). In other 
words, the better the management of a company understands the power and dynamics of 
macroeconomic factors on the capital structure, the more flexible and efficient it will be 
during the decision making process. 
 
Even though the macroeconomic environment cannot be predicted or controlled to a large 
extent, the management of a company can mitigate the impact of the unexpected fluctuations, 
and even take advantage of them, by adding the elements of adjustability and flexibility to the 
structure of the company’s operations. Oxelheim and Wihlborg (2008: p.5), argue that in 
order this to happen it is crucial for the management “to recognize the interdependence 
among a number of macroeconomic variables and that these variables influence the firm 
through a variety of channels not captured by conventional accounting systems”.  
 
Being aware of the exposure to macroeconomic shocks, management can apply the MUST-
analysis approach (see Oxelheim and Wihlborg, 2008) in order to minimize this exposure. 
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Furthermore, the level of development of the economy should also be taken into 
consideration. According to Glen and Singh (2004), there is a considerable difference 
between the capital structure in developed and underdeveloped countries, as well as in 
countries that are under an economic transition from an undeveloped economy to a developed 
one. 
 
Another worth mentioning dimension in the discussion of the factors that influence the firms’ 
capital structure is the orientation of the economy. The distinction that can be made is 
between capital market oriented and bank oriented economies. Examples of typical capital 
market based economies are U.S.A and U.K., whereas examples of bank oriented economies 
are Germany, France and Japan (Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Levine, Ross, 1999). According to 
Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Levine, Ross (1999), capital market based economies are considered 
to be more transparent and protective to investors, whereas bank oriented economies are 
characterized by lower transparency and weaker investor protection.  
 
Moreover, they make a reference to their paper to the corporate ownership condition that 
exists in market-based and bank-based countries, stating that in bank-based economies (with 
Germany as the main representative), companies are held in a more concentrated way, while 
in market-based economies (the U.S.A., the United Kingdom) this is not the case. In addition, 
companies that operate in capital-based economies are characterized by a lower level of debt, 
in comparison with the firms that operate in bank oriented economies (Demirguc-Kunt, Asli 
& Levine, Ross, 1999). 
 
The purpose of this study is to determine the extent and direction of the impact of 
macroeconomic conditions on the capital structure decision. We aim to find how firms in 
Sweden are affected by the macroeconomic environment, when making their financing 
decision, considering the fact that Sweden is a bank-oriented economy (Lööf, 2004)
1
. 
 
Rajan and Zingales (1995: p.1445) argue that “… a better measure of the importance of the 
banking sector in financing a firm is the ratio of bank loans made to private sector over 
GDP”. In their study they conclude that this ratio is more important and substantial for bank-
oriented economies rather than for market oriented economies. Therefore, we include this 
variable in our model in order to determine the importance of the banking sector on the 
Swedish firms.  
A related study has been presented by Antoniou, A., Y. Guney, and K. Paudyal (2008). They 
use the example of the G5 countries, such as USA and UK (Capital Market Oriented 
economies) and Japan, Germany and France (Bank Oriented Economies) to investigate how 
do firms in those economies determine their capital structure. 
 
Antoniou et al. (2008) study reveals that there are both differences and similarities in the 
capital structure determinants of firms operating in capital market and bank oriented 
                                                          
1
 Lööf (2004), in his paper "Dynamic optimal capital structure and technical change", argues that companies in 
Sweden and most widely in Scandinavia, operate in a bank oriented system as it happens in Germany and 
France.  
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economies. They suggest that these differences can be attributed to the institutional 
arrangements and the legal traditions of these countries. Moreover, Antoniou et al. (2008) 
arrive in two important conclusions:  
(i) The results found for one country cannot be generalized to other countries which have 
different legal and institutional traditions. 
(ii) When trying to determine the financing strategy, managers take into account not only firm 
specific factors, but also the general market characteristics that apply to a specific country. 
 
Stimulated by these conclusions, we aim to investigate the macroeconomic determinants of 
capital structure of Swedish firms, from the angle of the bank orientation of the economy. The 
selection of Sweden for our study is determined by the existence of its distinct legal
2
 and 
institutional traditions which imply that the results of other papers on bank oriented 
economies cannot be generalized to Sweden.  
 
In addition to this, as far as we know, there is no other similar study which tries to determine 
the importance of banking sector as determinant of the Swedish firm’s capital structure. 
The output of this study will be valuable for the Swedish firms, since identifying the way that 
macroeconomic factors interact with the capital structure will give them the advantage of 
formulating an effective financing policy as well as predict their competitors’ reaction to the 
market changes.   
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we review the existing capital 
structure theories.  Section 3 presents an empirical review. The distinct characteristics of the 
Swedish economy are presented in section 4, whereas section 5 includes discussions about 
data collection and variable specifications. In section 6 we define the regression model, 
whereas section 7 displays the results and the analysis. Finally, the paper is concluded by 
section 8. 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 Legal scholars Merryman and Clark (1978) “…it is a set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes 
about the nature of the law, about the role of law in the society and the politics, about the proper organization 
and operation of a legal system, and about the way the law is or should be made, applied, studied, perfected 
and taught” 
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2. Review of existing theories 
 
During the last decades, many theories have been used in order to explain the companies’ 
preferences related to their finance decision. In our paper we are briefly presenting the most 
known of them:     
 
2.1. Pecking Order Theory  
Not taking the optimal capital structure as a target, Pecking Order Theory states that firms 
prefer internal to external finance, by following a hierarchy of financing sources that puts 
first the internal funds, then external debt and equity as last choice. Companies want to avoid 
giving ownership to external investors (by issuing equity) and because of this they try to 
solve their financing problem with debt, in case internal funds are not an option. Pecking 
Order Theory is considered to be the dominating theory in this area (Myers, S.C., and Majluf, 
N., 1984).  
 
2.2. Trade-off Theory 
The Trade-off theory of capital structure derives from the concept that firms prefer to be 
financed by a combination of external debt and equity. In this way, they benefit from the 
positive consequences of having debt (tax shield, managerial discipline, FCF control, etc.) but 
at the same time they have to tackle the costs that are associated with the use of debt 
(financial distress, reduced pricing flexibility, bankruptcy, asset substitution, etc.). This 
tradeoff related to the effect of debt will determine the optimal debt to equity ratio of the firm 
(Kraus, A., and R.H. Litzenberger, 1973). 
 
2.3. Free Cash Flow Theory 
According to Jensen’s free cash flow theory (1986), the use of debt can be an incentive for 
managers to be more productive, assuming access to large free cash flow. As we know, the 
more levered the firm is the higher the probability of default. This means that managers will 
have the motivation to invest in projects that will have a positive NPV, since the performance 
of the company is highly related to their personal profits. In this way, firms try to find the 
optimal amount of debt by balancing the bankruptcy cost of the increased debt and the benefit 
that this debt creates.   
 
2.4. Asymmetric Information Theory 
Another worth mentioning theory is Asymmetric Information Theory, which is based on the 
assumption that managers have a much better picture about the processes and the assets’ 
value of the firm. This theory proposes that debt is used as a mean of financing in order to 
avoid neglecting value-adding investment opportunities during economic recessions. As a 
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result, according to this theory, macroeconomic conditions will have a negative impact on the 
capital structure decisions.  
3. Review of Empirical Background 
 
At this point we present empirical findings from other studies, related to elements that affect 
firms’ capital structure: 
 
Stulz’s (1990) model deals with the relation between the managerial discretion and the role of 
firm’s financing decisions. He supports that the problems of overinvestment and 
underinvestment that occur when managers adopt a selfish behavior inside the company can 
be prevented by controlling the amount of cash and generally the resources that they have 
available. In other words, the capital structure can, to some extent, eliminate or decrease the 
agency cost of managerial discretion.  
 
Moreover, Stulz (1990) argues that an increase in cash flow leads to an increase of the 
optimal face value of debt. When operating in a period with high economic growth (high cash 
flow and low probability of bankruptcy) firms would prefer to use more debt in their finance 
mix. On the other hand, they would prefer to be financed with less debt during an economic 
recession, since the cash flow is limited. Taking the above into consideration, capital 
structure will be affected by the macroeconomic conditions in a positive way. 
 
Ross (1977) in his paper argues that firms tend to issue debt in order to be considered as a 
firm with solid and stable cash flow. In other words, issuing debt transfers a valid signal to 
potential investors and the general public in financial fields of a more productive and efficient 
firm.  
Leland and Pyle (1977) come to almost the same conclusion, adding that the equity that 
managers hold constitutes a signal of the firm quality. 
 
Myers and Majluf’s (1984) paper shows that, if investors possess less information than firm’s 
insiders about the value of an asset, or if there is information asymmetry problem, issuing 
equity by the firm would signal that the value of the asset is overestimated. Therefore there is 
a chance that investors would not be willing to pay for an overvalued asset and consequently 
the price of the asset would decrease significantly. This might create problems in the case that 
firms are required to finance investment projects by issuing equity, because the underpricing 
of equity may be so large that it may result in a net loss to existing shareholders. In this case, 
it would make no sense to proceed with the investment project even if its NPV is positive. 
 
Narayanan’s (1988) paper argues that firms have an incentive to use external debt in order to 
finance their projects, in an attempt to avoid underinvestment problems. Assuming an 
asymmetry of information, firms prefer to avoid the use of the undervalued equity for 
financing their investments, because in this way they will not miss beneficial investment 
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opportunities during economic recessions. In accordance with the pecking order theory 
mentioned above, Narayanan argues that debt is superior to equity as a financing solution, 
without though forgetting to refer to the risk that this financing option implies. 
 
Miller (1977) supports, in his paper, that leverage is negatively related to economic growth, 
while Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out the engagement of the lenders in monitoring the 
firms as a positive effect of debt. 
 
Korajczyk and Levy (2003) in their paper try to analyze the capital structure choice by using 
macroeconomic conditions. They model the capital structure as a function of firm-specific 
and macroeconomic conditions. Moreover, they divide the sample into two sub-samples of 
financially constrained and financially unconstrained firms. They find that capital structure 
decision is inversely related to the economic conditions for the relatively unconstrained 
sample of firms, whereas it is pro-cyclical for the relatively constrained sample of firms. 
They also conclude that in the case of unconstrained firms, the macroeconomic factors are 
significant for issue choice, while they are not always significant for constrained firms. 
 
Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006) is one of the first papers to show that macroeconomic 
conditions have implications to firms’ financing policies. The paper studies the impact of 
macroeconomic conditions on credit risk and capital structure choice. They argue that the 
default policy used to maximize shareholder’s value is characterized by a different threshold 
for each state and which are inversely related to macroeconomic conditions. Furthermore, 
they analyze the impact of macroeconomic conditions on the capital structure changes, and 
the debt capacity. Finally, their model predicts that the market leverage should be 
countercyclical. 
 
From this review of empirical studies, we realize that their results vary and that most of the 
times, they do not come to the same conclusion. We aim to address this issue once more, 
incorporating this time data provided by a Nordic country, Sweden. As mentioned above, 
Sweden is a bank-oriented economy like Germany and France. But it would be a mistake to 
generalize the results of other bank-oriented countries to the Swedish case due to its distinct 
legal and institutional traditions (Antoniou et al., 2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Characteristics of the Swedish economy 
In the early 90’s most of the North European countries sank into a two-year recession as 
banks’ capital froze and they stopped lending. Financial meltdown, rocketing unemployment 
and housing bubble burst were the main characteristics of Swedish economy, which up until 
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then was booming. The recession that Sweden suffered between 1992-1994, resulted to a 
GDP loss of 5% and high unemployment, which remained high for a long period. In order to 
tackle this problematic situation, the Swedish government decided to inject a large amount of 
money in the banking system. The key success factor in regulating the bank system and 
generally in stabilizing the economy with disciplined fiscal measures, was the consensus 
from all the political parties, regardless of which party was in power. 
During the recent financial crisis in 2008, Sweden was not affected to the extent that other 
countries were. According to Professor Calmfors (2012) (Stockholm University): “Sweden 
went into the crisis in 2008 in a stable and reasonable shape with quite a large fiscal surplus. 
There has been no need for fiscal tightening during the crisis as in many of the Eurozone 
countries with high government debt”. In an attempt to further explain the reasons why 
Sweden felt the impact of the recession less than elsewhere, Calmfors (2012) adds: “The 
lesson from the crisis in the 1990s was that the fiscal house must be kept in order and that in 
normal times if you can shore up your finances you have room for manoeuvre later during a 
recession”. However, we should not neglect the fact that the crisis of 2008, has negatively 
affected Sweden in issues such as unemployment, exchange rate stability and exports.  
 
Another important fact that contributed to the “soft landing” of Swedish economy during the 
recent crisis is the flexibility in terms of monetary policy, given that Sweden is not a member 
of the Eurozone. Having the ability to control its own monetary and fiscal policy, Sweden can 
to a large extent hedge its economy in terms of exchange rate, inflation and interest rate 
fluctuations worldwide. Also, given the openness of the Swedish economy to international 
trade and its traditionally export orientation, the ability of Sweden to conduct and adjust its 
monetary policy constitutes a crucial factor in positioning the country on a highly competitive 
level. Other elements that enhance the competitiveness of Sweden compared to other 
countries are its strategic location, its highly qualified work-force, and the systematic focus 
on technological research. 
 
Moreover, given the systematic regulation of the banks and the considerable development of 
this sector in Sweden during the last years, it is easy to understand the close relationship of 
Swedish firms with the banks. According to Han-Suck Song (2005), Swedish companies are 
on average characterized by a high level of leverage, with short-term debt constituting a 
relatively big part of the companies’ total debt.  
 
Another important characteristic of the Swedish system which is worthwhile to note, is the 
high transparency and consensus in the political decision making process. This implies a 
reduced political risk and flexibility in formulating the conditions for doing business. Foreign 
investment inside the Swedish territory is encouraged and supported by the government and 
more specifically by The Swedish Trade and Invest Council which provides assistance to all 
the foreign companies that seek to establish or expand their business in Sweden. This 
assistance includes a set of financial incentives such as loans, grants, credit guarantees, etc. 
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As far as the legal system is considered, in Sweden is applied a combination of statute and 
case law. Also, the fact that Sweden is a member of EU (since 1995) implies that the 
European Union Law is incorporated in the Swedish legal system.  
 
5. Data Collection  
 
The sample used in this study consists of the firms listed on the OMX Stockholm (OMXS) 
which in total are 288. According to the industry classification which is presented on Table 1, 
the companies are divided into ten industries.  The firms from Financial Industry such as 
Banks, Insurance Companies, Real Estate Investment and other financial companies are 
excluded from the sample, because of their special financial structure. The names of the 
excluded financial companies from the original sample of 288 firms are presented on Table 
number 2. 
The final sample of firms that we take into consideration consists of 233 firms. The chosen 
sample period ranges between the years 2002-2012 and we use annual data for 
macroeconomic factors and the firm-specific variables. The source of the collected data is 
Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
As far as outliers are concerned, their influence is not considered to be substantial, especially 
for macro-economic variables, since our study uses ratios. As for the firm-specific variables, 
especially for the leverage ratios, there were detected some outliers, most of them extremely 
high. We used the Microsoft Excel function “if” to detect and remove outliers from the data.  
The function treated all the ratios more than ±5 as outliers. Also, negative ratios, which were 
counter to the logic of the ratio (e.g Dividend payout ratio cannot be negative) were treated as 
well. 
 
5.1 Variables Specification 
 
The variables used in this study are based on theoretical foundations suggested by capital 
structure theories as well as on previous studies. We transformed existing models by 
employing new variables. Most of the studies that investigate this field, try to use new, 
unique variables as determinants of capital structure, in order to contribute to the research. As 
Harris and Raviv (1991) show in their article, the motives and the considerations that could 
determine the capital structure choices seem nearly uncountable. However, there are some 
determinants of capital structure that are most commonly used.  
 
The majority of the studies use firm specific variables in order to determine the capital 
structure preference, while others use macroeconomic variables as well. According to 
Oxelheim (1999: p.69) “The corporate view on the magnitude and extent of influence of 
macroeconomic factors has grown gradually, which has biased the company’s way of 
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handling these factors”. In our paper, we mainly use macroeconomic variables, including 
some firm specific variables at the same time (see variables description on Table 3). 
 
5.1.1 Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable in our model is the measure of leverage. Taking into consideration 
the differences in the composition of liabilities, we choose Total Debt to Common Equity 
ratio as a measure of leverage. Other leverage ratios such as Debt to Total Capital ratio, Debt 
to Total Asset ratio, Short-term debt to Equity ratio and Long-term to Equity ratio are also 
included for comparison reasons with the main leverage measure, in order to check that 
results of our leverage measure are not special to the chosen time period. We use book 
values, rather than market values, since the difference between leverage ratios measured by 
book and market value is due to variations in stock prices rather than firm’s financing 
decision. We support this statement by Asgharian’s (1997:60) study, where it is concluded 
that:  “A comparison of the results obtained for leverage ratios based on book and market 
values of equity indicated that there may be a positive correlation between the market value 
of equity and the explanatory variables, such as collateral value of assets, manager’s 
shareholding and dividend payments. This finding questions the adequacy of using the market 
value of equity in the leverage ratio”. 
 
5.1.2 Explanatory Variables 
 
The explanatory variables in the model are both firm and time variant. The firm-specific 
variables, such as the size and the type of the assets are almost invariant over time. They are 
not included in the model, because these variables may result in a multicollinearity problem, 
and their coefficients will not be estimable (Hsioa, 1986). 
 
Profitability Ratio 
 
We use profitability ratio as an explanatory variable in our model, because according to 
Pecking Order theory, an internal source of financing decreases the requirement for external 
financing. Therefore, profitability should be considered as one of the firm-specific 
explanatory variables. Rajan and Zingales (1995), as well as Asgharian (1997) find that there 
is an inverse relation between leverage and profitability, with Asgharian (1997:100) 
explaining that this “may simply arise from the fact that profit in each year is added to the 
value of equity in that year”. On the contrary, the Free Cash Flow theory and the Asymmetric 
Information theory find a positive relation between profitability and debt ratio. In the first 
case, more debt means more disciplined managers and reduced agency cost of free cash flow, 
while in the second case, profitability and leverage give a sign of a highly efficient company. 
We define profitability as the ratio of the operational profit to total revenue. We use the profit 
before financial items as a measure of our profitability, in order to avoid the direct effect of 
leverage on financial costs.  
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Dividend Payment Ratio 
 
We use dividend payment ratio as a firm-specific explanatory variable, since dividend 
reduces internally available funds and thus increases the demand for external financing. 
According to Allen (1993) and Chang and Rhee (1990), dividend payment has a positive 
effect on leverage. On the other hand, Rozeff (1982) and Mackie-Manson (1990) and 
Asgharian (1997) findings show a negative relationship between leverage and dividend 
payment. We define dividend payment ratio as the total cash dividend over the Net Income. 
 
 
Stock Price performance Ratio 
 
We use stock price volatility (the percentage change in stock prices) as a proxy for market 
performance. Asgharian (1997) and Dimitrov and Jain (2008) in their studies find negative 
relationship between market performance and leverage ratios. Firms tend to issue equity in 
the favorable stock market conditions; therefore we employ this ratio as a potential 
determinant of the capital structure decision for Swedish firms and also predict that this 
variable should be negatively correlated with the leverage ratio. 
GDP Growth 
 
Many studies use GDP growth rate as a determinant of capital structure. The growth rate of 
GDP is argued to measure how much easier it will be for firms to service debt costs in the 
future. In previous studies, which are mainly undertaken in developing countries, the Growth 
Rate has an inverse and significant relation with the capital structure preference Bokpin, 
(2009); Dincergok & Yalciner, (2011). Booth et al. (2001) paper, which focuses on the 
capital structure determinants in developing countries, finds that the economic growth 
development is positively related to the total debt and the long-term book-debt ratio. During 
economic growth, the debt in the capital structure tends to increase in firms operating in 
developing countries. However, Gajurel (2005) concluded that the macroeconomic conditions 
have a significant influence in the financing decision and that GDP growth rate is inversely 
related to the level of debt on the capital structure.  
 
 
Inflation Rate 
 
Another important explanatory factor is the inflation rate. The findings here seem to differ 
substantially with each other. For example, Bastos, Nakamura & Basso (2009) argue that 
inflation does not influence the capital structure, whereas Murray & Goyal (2009) find a 
relation between inflation and the market leverage, without though finding an effect on the 
book leverage. Moreover, Camara (2012) shows that the macroeconomic conditions, 
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including the inflation rate, have a significant relation with capital structure. Sett & Sarkhel 
(2010), Hanousek & Shamshur (2011) also argue that inflation has a strong and positive 
impact on the capital structure. Apart from that, Gajurel (2006) finds that inflation is 
negatively related to the total leverage and the short-term debt ratio, but has a positive 
influence on the long-term debt ratio. 
 
 
 
Interest Rate 
 
Interest rate, on the other hand, seems to affect the corporate capital structure in a positive 
and significant way Bokpin (2009). However, Dincergok & Yalciner (2011) support that the 
interest rate and the capital structure is not positively related.   
       
Corporate Tax Rate 
 
The Tax rate is also considered one of the determinants of capital structure. For those firms, 
that are able to utilize interest payment deductibility, a decrease in the corporate tax rate 
means a diminished benefit of debt financing. In his paper, Myers (2003) concludes that 
despite the existence of some tax-driven financing methods (for example: financial leases), it 
is difficult to show in a clear way that taxes do have a considerable effect on the financing 
options. 
 
Exchange Rates 
 
Exchange rate can also be one of the determinants of capital structure because Swedish 
economy is largely export-reliant and as a result the majority of its trade settlements are in 
foreign currencies.  Also, Swedish firms are internationally represented and have access to 
international capital markets and financial institutions. Therefore, currency fluctuations can 
affect the capital structure of firms with large foreign debt. Having said that, we consider that 
it is reasonable to ask if or how firms with these characteristics use leverage in order to 
mitigate their exposure to international exchange rate fluctuations. 
 
 
Banking Loan to Non-financial Private Sector % GDP 
 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that a measure of the importance of the banking sector in the 
firms’ choice of the financing policy is the ratio of bank loans made to private sector over 
GDP. In their studies, they conclude that this ratio is more important and substantial in Bank-
oriented economies. 
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6. Regression Model 
 
According to empirical studies conducted previously, there is evidence that there is a 
relationship between macroeconomic variables and the capital structure of firms. Some of the 
empirical studies concentrate on identifying the firm specific factors that managers should 
pay attention to when making the capital structure choice, while they underestimate the 
possible implications of macroeconomic conditions that could affect the choice of financing 
mix. In this paper, we combine firm specific variables with macroeconomic ones, in order to 
control for the possible implications of such factors on capital structure decisions. Our period 
of interest is between 2002 -2012. 
A Panel Data is used to analyze the impact of macroeconomic variables on Capital Structure. 
We use Panel data, because it increases on the degrees of freedom, deals with the collinearity 
issue among the explanatory variables (decreases it), and consequently allows for more 
efficient estimates. Both fixed and random effect panel data analyses are applied to deal with 
the firm heterogeneity, which may be caused by characteristics that differ among firms but 
are invariant over time.  Problems such as heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity are also 
taken into consideration. 
We follow the setup and let the leverage ratio for firm i=1,…,N, at time t=2002,…,T, be 
denoted as     .Specifically, in this model the leverage ratio should vary across firms and 
over time. Since the macroeconomic factors determining the firms’ optimal leverage may 
change over time, it is possible that the Capital structure itself may also move over time for 
the same firm. We denote firm-specific variables as “F” and macroeconomic variables as 
“M” in our model below (1). In this model, firm specific variables vary across time and firm 
while macroeconomic variables are the same for every firm, but vary across time. The model 
is specified as follows:  
                           ∑            ∑                   (1) 
The capital structure of any company is measured in terms of its leverage ratios. The debt-to-
equity ratio is a financial ratio which describes the amount of debt and equity used in the 
financing of a company. In this study, the capital structure of the firms is measured in terms 
of Debt to Equity Ratio. Apart from this ratio, we also use the Total Debt to Total Capital and 
the Total Debt to Total assets ratio for better comparative results. In addition to these ratios, 
we also include the Long Term Debt to Equity and the Short Term Debt to Equity ratios in 
order to check if there is any substantial difference according to the time length. 
A pooled regression has some restricted assumptions which imply no cross-sectional 
heterogeneity and no period effects. In particular, a pooled regression assumes that the 
estimated coefficients are the same for each cross-section (firms) and over the years. “OLS 
specification assumes that all the explanatory variables are strictly exogenous. However, this 
is a naive presumption since the random events affecting the dependent variable are likely to 
influence the explanatory variables as well” Antoniou et al. (2008:11). This means that it is 
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necessary to account for heterogeneity in the data, because everything that is not explained in 
a pooled regression is transferred to error terms. Cross section and period heterogeneity are 
tested further on by running different models. 
 
 
 
6.1 Fixed Effects Model 
 
In the regression equation (1), the disturbance term      could be decomposed in an individual 
entity-specific effect   , and a remainder disturbance,    . The residual     contains the 
effects of all the unobserved variables that are not included in the regression and varies over 
time and across entities. Consequently, the disturbance term     may be defined as: 
           
So, we can rewrite equation (1). First we simplify our notation of firm specific “F” and 
macroeconomic variables “M” with      (1×k vector of explanatory variables) and then we 
substitute with the new definition of    . 
                      (2) 
Where             
   
There are several strategies available for estimating the fixed effect models. The Least Square 
Dummy Variable model (LSDV) is the model that is used more due to its easy estimation and 
its concrete interpretation. The Dummy variable representation of the fixed effects model is 
just a standard regression model and can be estimated by OLS. 
                                 
,where     constitutes a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for all observations that are on the 
first entity (e.g. the first firm) of the sample and zero otherwise,     is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 for all observations on the second entity (e.g. the second firm) and zero 
otherwise, and so on. When the number of cross-sectional units (firms) in the panel data is 
large, LSDV displays some weaknesses. If time is fixed and the number of the cross-sectional 
units (firms) goes to the infinity, only coefficients of repressors are consistent. The dummy 
variables coefficients are not characterized by consistency since these parameters increase 
with the increase of the number of the units Baltagi (2001). In this panel data, time dimension 
(T) is small. It contains only the period from 2002 – 2012 while the number of cross-section 
units is pretty large (233). Therefore, a lot of parameters need to be estimated, resulting in a 
huge loss of degrees of freedom. Hence, Within Transformation method helps to save more 
degrees of freedom since it is not necessary to estimate that many dummy variables 
parameters. Thus, the standard errors for each dependent variable are smaller than in the 
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Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) regression. Consequently, the estimates are more 
precise and the slopes of non-dummy independent variables are identical. The between 
transformation effect model also does not use dummies but produces different parameter 
estimates. To check whether Fixed effects model output is well specified, we use Redundant 
Fixed Effects tests. 
 
6.2 Random Effects Model 
 
Another way to account for heterogeneity is to run the random effects model. The Random 
Effects model, which is equivalent to the Generalized Least Square (GLS), needs to follow 
some severe restrictions in order to be applied in our regression. According to this method, 
the subtraction of the necessary mean value seems to be a better and more advanced solution 
than subtracting the whole mean value over all the cross-section units. Therefore, using the 
Random effect model we do not lose any degrees of freedom, since we do not use more 
variables, we just make transformations, so it is more efficient than the dummy fixed test. 
The problem of the Random effect model is that it follows a severe restriction since it is 
necessary for the independent variables to be exogenous (             ), so as not to have 
biased and inconsistent estimates. As it follows, we are going to run a Hausman Test to check 
the applicability of the Random model. Furthermore, if we reject the null hypothesis of 
Hausman Test, we will use the fixed effect model. 
 
                       (3) 
Where           ,             
   and             
   
The    are independent of the     and both            are independent of the    . 
According to Brooks (2008, p. 498-499) the transformation involved in this GLS procedure is 
to subtract a weighted mean of the     , over time (i.e. part of the mean and not the whole 
mean, as was the case for fixed effects estimation). The ‘quasi-demeaned’ data is defined as 
         ̅  and  
        ̅  , where  ̅  and  ̅  are the means over time of the 
observations on     and,     respectively. θ is a function of the variance of the observation 
error term,   
  , and of the variance of the entity-specific error term,   
 . 
    
  
√        
 
This transformation will ensure that there are no cross-correlations in the error terms.  
The standard error-components models assume that there is heterogeneity between entities in 
the cross-sectional dimension, causing errors to be correlated within cross-sectional units like 
firms in our data. In a similar way, we could also have "heterogeneity" in the time dimension. 
We can easily allow for time variation, as for cross-sectional variation, in the random effects 
model 
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                       (4) 
Where            
 
7. Results of the Regression Specification 
 
Firstly, a pooled regression is estimated (see Appendix A_1). It can be seen that P-values are 
significant for Bank Credit % GDP (CREDIT_GDP), Inflation Rate (INF_RATE), Interest 
Rate (INT_RATE) and Stock Price Performance (STOCK_PER_RATIO). Bank Credit % 
GDP and Inflation Rate are statistically significant at 5% significance level, while Interest 
Rate and Stock Price Performance are significant at 1% level of significance. All the 
significant variables, except for Inflation Rate, have positive effects on Debt to Equity ratio. 
 
A noticeable problem is the low value for Durbin-Watson statistic (0.6337) which might 
imply autocorrelation or some specification errors. 
An extended Chow test (Test for poolability) could be used to check whether a pooled 
regression is appropriate or not. Since our data is missing many observations, and there are 
too many cross-sectional units (233 firms) in the sample, we choose another method to check 
for heterogeneity. The Graph of residuals from the pooled regression (Appendix A_2) shows 
a noticeable tendency in the residuals (variation below and above zero is in a systematical 
way), which indicates possible Heterogeneity. 
 
A pooled regression is characterized by the restricted assumptions of no cross-sectional 
(firms) heterogeneity and no period effects. Particularly, a pooled regression makes the 
assumption that the estimated coefficients are the same for each cross-section and over the 
years. One of the assumptions of the OLS specification is the strict exogeneity of the 
explanatory variables. However, this could be a simplistic presumption since the random 
events affecting the dependent variable are likely to influence the explanatory variables as 
well. This means that it is necessary to account for heterogeneity in the data, because 
everything that is not explained in a pooled regression is transferred to error terms.  
 
In this particular panel data there are 233 firms and only a short sample period 2002-2012 
with missing observations. It can be suggested that cross-sectional dimension is important 
and it is optional to account for heterogeneity in the period dimension. The Cross section and 
period heterogeneity are tested further on by running different models. Figure 1 presents an 
overview of all the tested models. Due to unbalanced data we cannot estimate a combination 
of fixed and random effects as well as two-way random effects model.  
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Figure 1 
 
 
7.1 Cross-Section Fixed effects Model 
 
To begin with our model, Appendix A_3 depicts Cross-Section fixed Effects model with 
Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) representation.  It can be observed that only Bank 
Credit % GDP and Inflation Rate are statistically significant at 5% significance level while 
Interest Rate at 1% level of significance. Stock Price Performance is insignificant as 
compared to the results of pooled regression. In order to test whether the Cross-Sectional 
Fixed Effects model is well specified, we run the Redundant Fixed effects test, as it is 
presented in Appendix A_3.1. The P-value of the cross-section F-test is zero with four 
decimals, indicating that the coefficients of the dummy variables used in the fixed effects 
model are statistically significant. Therefore, the Pooled regression cannot be used because 
the dummy variables have some explanatory power in the cross-section fixed effects model. 
 
7.2 Cross-Section Random effects Model 
 
According to Appendix A_4, which presents the Cross-Section Random Effects model, Bank 
Credit % GDP, Inflation Rate and Interest Rate are statistically significant at 1% significance 
level, Stock Price Performance at 5% level of Significance, while GDP growth rate at 10% 
level of significance. In order to test whether Cross-Section Random Effects model is well 
specified, we run Hauseman test (Appendix A_4.1) for the random effects being uncorrelated 
with the explanatory variables. According to the P-Value (0.0536) of chi-square test, we 
accept the null hypothesis that the model is well-specified. 
 
7.3 Period Random effects Model 
 
According to Appendix A_5, which is concerned with the Period Random Effects model, 
only Bank Credit % GDP and Inflation Rate are statistically significant at 5% significance 
level, while Interest Rate and Stock Price Performance at 1% level of Significance.  In order 
Fixed Random None
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to test if the Period Random Effects model is well specified, we run a Hauseman test 
(Appendix A_5.1) for the random effects being uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. 
According to the P-Value (0.8198) of the chi-square test, we accept the null hypothesis that 
the model is well-specified.  
Figure 2 shows the summary of the all the regressions that we made, including the Pooled 
regression.  
Figure 2 
 
 
 
7.4 Multicollinearity and Heteroscedasticity  
 
Two other important points to consider are testing for multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity 
in our panel data. Firstly, according to the Appendix A_6, it can be observed that there is no 
sign of multicollinearity between the explanatory variables, as none of the correlation 
coefficients is equal or bigger than 0.8.  
Then, we consider the problem of heteroskedasticity and in order to see if the variances of the 
residual values are constant we choose to run the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey (BPG) test as we 
see in Appendix A_7. The results show a statistically insignificant p-value (0.5347) at the 5% 
significance level. Therefore, we can accept the null hypothesis that the disturbance terms are 
homoscedastic. 
 
 
7.5 Choice of the model 
 
According to the results of Redundant and Hauseman tests, Cross-section Fixed effect, Cross-
Section Random effects and Time Period Random Effects models are accepted. Generally, 
the random effect model is preferred to the fixed effect model since it is more efficient and it 
corrects the model only by the necessary amount that is needed to get rid of within-cross-
section (or within-period) correlation between the residuals. So, we shall proceed with 
Random effects models.  
 
Now, we have to choose between Random Cross-sectional and Period models. We consider 
that the cross-sectional (Firms) dimension as more important than the period dimension in 
C CREDIT_GDP CTAX_RATA DIV_PAY_RATIO GDP_G_RATE INF_RATE INT_RATE KRONA_EUR_RATE KRONA_USD_RATE PROF_RATIO STOCK_PER_RATIO
Cross-Section Fixed Effects -0.3324 0.4542 -1.2868 0.0002 1.2789 -6.4723 12.5980 0.0096 0.01901 -0.04318 0.4222
(P-Values) (0.5164) (0.0117) (0.3438) (0.8619) (0.1800) (0.0169) (0.0007) (0.7789) (0.4840) (0.2637) (0.2721)
Cross-Section Random Effects -0.5080 0.4871 -1.0293 -1.63E-05 1.5115 -7.2155 13.7251 0.0070 0.0231 -0.0005 0.6838
(P-Values) (0.3140) (0.0057) (0.4439) (0.9895) (0.0982) (0.0066) (0.0002) (0.8355) (0.3903) (0.9868) (0.0276)
Time Period Random Effect -0.8191 0.5624 -0.4060 -0.0008 2.1345 -8.9114 16.9817 0.0086 0.0314 0.0454 0.7594
(P-Values) (0.2309) (0.0184) (0.8258) (0.5994) (0.1043) (0.0150) (0.0007) (0.8509) (0.4019) (0.1347) (0.0034)
Pooled Regression -0.8191 0.5624 -0.4060 -0.0008 2.1345 -8.9114 16.9817 0.0086 0.0314 0.0454 0.7594
(P-Values) (0.2304) (0.0183) (0.8255) (0.5990) (0.1039) (0.0149) (0.0007) (0.8507) (0.4013) (0.1342) (0.0033)
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our sample since there are 233 firms (Cross-section units) and only 11 years (Periods), in 
which some observations are absent. Also, Figure 2 clearly shows that with the Cross-Section 
Random effects model, the Bank Credit % GDP, Inflation Rate and Interest Rate variables 
are statistically significant at 1%, the Stock Price Performance at 5% and the GDP growth 
rate at 10% level of significance. Whereas, for the Period Random Effects model, only the 
Interest Rate and the Stock Price Performance variables are statistically significant at 1% 
level of significance, while Bank Credit % GDP and Inflation Rate are statistically significant 
at 5% level of significance.  
Considering this, we use Cross-Section Random Effects model for further analysis.  
 
7.6 Analysis of the Results 
  
Our findings show that there is a relation between macroeconomic elements and the capital 
structure of the Swedish firms. More specifically, we find that the capital structure is affected 
by macroeconomic factors such as Inflation, Interest Rate, Banking Credit over GDP and 
GDP growth rate. We can also see that from the firm specific variables that we included in 
the model, only the Stock price performance ratio is significant with 5% level of significance. 
 
In addition to Debt to Equity ratio as a measure of leverage, we also use other leverage 
measures in order to check that the result of leverage measure is not special to the chosen 
time period. The results of those leverage ratios, such as Debt to Total Capital ratio, Debt to 
Total Asset ratio, Short-term debt to Equity ratio and Long-term to Equity ratio are presented 
on Table 3. 
 
One important finding is the significance of the Banking Credit as % of GDP variable. This 
variable according to Rajan and Zingales (1995) is a measure of the importance of the 
banking sector in the process of selection type of financing for a firm. This variable is also 
significant for other leverage measures such as Total Debt to Equity ratio and Total Debt to 
Assets ratio. Results in Table 3 show that the Banking Credit as % GDP variable is positively 
related to the leverage measures, which is not a surprising outcome even from a theoretical 
point of view.  
 
Since, in bank oriented economies banks provide most of the credit, business loans require 
banks to control the activities and management of a firm, implying the costly collection of 
inside information. On the other hand, potential advantage of monitoring and access to inside 
information is the development of long term relationships between banks and borrower firms. 
This has particular importance during financial crisis or macroeconomic shocks. During a 
crisis, banks’ access to inside information allows them to continue lending to financially 
credible firms, while financial markets are illiquid. This suggests that firms from bank 
oriented economies might suffer less from global financial crisis. The importance and impact 
of banking sector on Swedish economy, as well as the other factors discussed in section 4, 
have contributed to the so-called soft landing of the Swedish economy during the financial 
crisis of 2008. 
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The sharp rise of the mean leverage measure for Swedish firms (Table 5) can be observed 
during the financial crisis of 2008, even though the median leverage ratio for the same time 
period is reduced. By analyzing the leverage measure by industry (Table 6), we conclude that 
despite the financial crisis, the increase in mean leverage derives from the bank’s access to 
inside information and lending to financially sound firms. 
 
 
Moreover, as we can see on Table 3, Inflation Rate is significant and negatively associated 
with the total leverage ratio and significantly positive with the long term ratio. However, we 
do not find any significance with the short term debt.  This result is consistent with Gajurel’s 
(2006) study and contradictory to Sett & Sarkhel (2010), Hanousek & Shamshur (2011) 
papers that support a positive relation between Inflation rate and leverage. From these results 
we conclude that an increase in inflation rate leads to an increase in long term debt and to a 
decrease of the total debt.  
 
As far as Interest Rate is concerned, we find that it significant at 1% level and positively 
correlated with the leverage measure, as Bokpin (2009) suggests in his study. We have the 
same relationship for debt to capital and debt to assets ratios. As for the long term debt to 
equity ratio, we find it significant at 10% level and with inverse relationship to interest rate, 
which goes in line with Dincergok & Yalciner (2011) findings.  
 
Stock Price Performance is statistically significant at 5% level of significance and affects the 
total leverage in a positive way. Table 3 shows that debt to capital and debt to asset ratios are 
also significant and positively affected by Stock Price Performance. However, we do not find 
any significance considering the short or the long term debt. This result is not in line with 
Asgharian (1977) and Dimitrov and Jain (2008), who fined a negative relation between 
leverage and Stock price performance.  
An important variable is GDP growth Rate which is considered to be a reflection of all the 
other variables. We find it significant at 10% level and positively related to Debt to equity, 
debt to capital and debt to assets ratios. Our findings are consistent with Booth et al (2001), 
Stulz (1990) studies. Bokpin (2009), Dincergok and Yalciner (2011) and Gajurel (2005) in 
their paper find negative relationship with leverage measures. A possible explanation for this 
finding, could be the fact that their study is conducted for companies that operate in 
developing countries. An increase in GDP growth rate signals a positive effect on the firm’s 
earnings, which means more internally available funds, therefore, in developing countries 
companies react to GDP growth rate inversely, as it is shown in the studies of Bokpin (2009), 
Dincergok and Yalciner (2011) and Gajurel (2005). As far as developed economies are 
concerned, an increase in GDP growth rate may signal ease of servicing the debt in the future, 
thus engaging in the value maximizing activities with leverage.  
Considering the variables that are insignificant, we can say that the insignificance of 
Corporate Tax Rate is consistent with Myers (2003), whereas the insignificance of the 
 19 
 
Profitability and Dividend Payout is inverse to other studies that, as mentioned in section 5, 
consider them positively or negatively related to leverage.  
 
Furthermore, both Exchange Rate (SEK/EUR) and Exchange Rate (SEK/USD) are not 
significant, despite the access of Swedish firms to international capital markets, the export 
reliance of the economy and the international transactions that this implies. On a relative 
study, which relates the movements in the exchange rate with the firms’ value, Nydahl (1999) 
finds that the Swedish firms’ stock price is quite sensitive to exchange rate fluctuations, 
compared for example to U.S. firms. Moreover, Bartov and Bodnar (1994), argue that the 
selection of the sample is a crucial element when investigating the exchange rate exposure of 
the companies. According to them, it is important to choose companies that would be 
affected, in the same way, in the case of currency appreciation or depreciation. So, one reason 
that the exchange rate variable is insignificant in our paper could be the inclusion on the 
sample of firms that possess large debt in foreign currencies and of firms that do not have this 
characteristic. Moreover, other studies, such as Allayannis and Olek (1996), mention that 
firms use hedging instruments (e.g. currency derivatives) in order to be protected against 
exchange rate changes. This could also be one of the reasons that in our study, Swedish 
companies’ capital structure is not affected by the exchange rate changes. In addition, the fact 
that some Swedish companies have established some part of their production lines in other 
countries, could be a natural hedge towards the exchange rate fluctuations. 
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8. Conclusion 
 
In this study, we prove the relation of some macroeconomic variables with the capital 
structure of Swedish firms and provide evidence that Rajan and Zingales’s (1995) argument 
about the importance of the Bank credit as percentage to GDP variable for bank oriented 
economies, is credible, since we find that it is significant and positively related to the 
leverage measures. Using unbalanced panel data for 233 firms, for the 2002-2012 sample 
period and by using a Random Effects model, we find that four (GDP growth rate, Inflation 
Rate, Interest Rate, Bank credit as % GDP) out of the seven macroeconomic variables used in 
our regression model are significant. On the other hand, from the three firm-specific 
variables, Stock price performance is the one that is significant.  
 
 
By describing the distinct characteristics of the Swedish economy in section 4, we show that 
the results of other studies related to bank oriented economies cannot be generalized on the 
Swedish case. Therefore, our study contributes to the knowledge by identifying the 
macroeconomic determinants of capital structure and by providing the proof that the banking 
sector is important for the Swedish companies and that does affect their financing decision in 
a positive way.  
 
 
The result of this study is valuable for the Swedish firms, since identifying the way that 
macroeconomic factors affect the capital structure will give them the advantage of 
formulating an effective financing policy as well as predict their competitors’ reaction to the 
market changes.   
 
For the future research, it would be interesting to incorporate in the regression model 
variables that reflect the legal and financial traditions of Sweden. This would be a valuable 
contribution to the literature, since as we mention above, the capital structure decision of a 
company is determined not only by its specific characteristics and the macro-economy but 
also by the institutional and financial traditions under which it operates. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Appendix A_1: Output of the Pooled Regression 
 
 
 
The table depicts the output of the pooled regression from the “EViews 8” software. It is observable that P-
values are significant for Bank Credit % GDP (CREDIT_GDP), Inflation Rate (INF_RATE), Interest Rate 
(INT_RATE) and Stock Price Performance (STOCK_PER_RATIO). Bank Credit % GDP and Inflation Rate are 
statistically significant at a 5% significance level, while Interest Rate and Stock Price Performance are 
significant at a 1% level of significance. The low value for Durbin-Watson statistic (0.6337) might imply 
autocorrelation or some specification errors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Coefficient Probability 
C 0.819171 0.2304 
Bank Credit as % to GDP 0.562421 0.0183 
Corporate Tax Rate 0.406020 0.8255 
Dividend Payout Ratio 0.000828 0.5990 
GDP Growth Rate 2.134573 0.1039 
Inflation Rate 8.911492 0.0149 
Interest Rate 16.98176 0.0007 
Krona/Euro Exchange Rate 0.008692 0.8507 
Krona/USD Exchange Rate 0.031497 0.4013 
Profitability Ratio 0.045481 0.1342 
Stock Price Performance 0.759475 0.0033 
R-Squared   0.034981 
Probability (F-Statistic)   0.000568 
Durbin-Watson Stat.   0.633750 
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Appendix A_2: Residuals of Pooled Regression 
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The Graph of residuals from the pooled regression shows a noticeable pattern in the 
residuals. Variation below and above zero is in a systematical way, which indicates possible 
Heterogeneity. 
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Appendix A_3: Output of a Model with Cross-Section Fixed Effects 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A_3.1: Redundant Test for Cross-section Fixed Effects Model 
 
Effects Test     Statistic                         d.f.         Probability 
Cross-Section F     7.057322                       (142.727)        0.0000 
Cross-Section Chi-Square     762.478472                       142        0.0000 
 
 
To test whether the Cross-Sectional Fixed Effects model is well specified, we run the Redundant Fixed effects 
test. The P-value of the cross-section F-test is zero with four decimals (0.0000), indicating the significance and 
the applicability of the Cross-section fixed effects model specification. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Coefficient Probability 
C -0.332439 0.5164 
Bank Credit as % to GDP 0.454213 0.0117 
Corporate Tax Rate -1.286831 0.3438 
Dividend Payout Ratio 0.000217 0.8619 
GDP Growth Rate 1.278968 0.1800 
Inflation Rate -6.472365 0.0169 
Interest Rate 12.59801 0.0007 
Krona/Euro Exchange Rate 0.009696 0.7789 
Krona/USD Exchange Rate 0.019017 0.4840 
Profitability Ratio -0.043186 0.2637 
Stock Price Performance 0.422204 0.2721 
R-Squared   0.594267 
Probability (F-Statistic)   0.000000 
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Appendix A_4: Output of a Model with Cross-Section Random Effects 
 
Variable Coefficient Probability 
C -0.508092 0.3140 
Bank Credit as % to GDP 0.487123 0.0057 
Corporate Tax Rate -1.029308 0.4439 
Dividend Payout Ratio -1.63E-05 0.9895 
GDP Growth Rate 1.511533 0.0982 
Inflation Rate -7.215562 0.0066 
Interest Rate 13.72516 0.0002 
Krona/Euro Exchange Rate 0.007023 0.8355 
Krona/USD Exchange Rate 0.023191 0.3903 
Profitability Ratio -0.000518 0.9868 
Stock Price Performance 0.683815 0.0276 
 
 
 
Appendix A_4.1: Hausman Test for Cross-section Random Effects Model 
 
Test Summary Chi-Squared Statistic Chi-Squared d.f. Probability 
Cross-Section Random 18.082310 10 0.0536 
 
 
To test whether the Cross-Section Random Effects model is well specified, we run the Hauseman test for the 
random effects being uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. According to the P-Value (0.0536) of the chi-
square test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, we accept the null hypothesis that the Cross-
sectional Random Effects model is well-specified. 
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Appendix A_5: Output of a Model with Time Period Random Effects 
 
 
Variable Coefficient Probability 
C -0.819171 0.2309 
Bank Credit as % to GDP 0.562421 0.0184 
Corporate Tax Rate -0.406020 0.8258 
Divident Payout Ratio -0.000828 0.5994 
GDP Growth Rate 2.134573 0.1043 
Inflation Rate -8.911492 0.0150 
Interest Rate 16.98176 0.0007 
Krona/Euro Exchange Rate 0.008692 0.8509 
Krona/USD Exchange Rate 0.031497 0.4019 
Profitability Ratio 0.045481 0.1347 
Stock Price Performance 0.759475 0.0034 
 
 
 
Appendix A_5.1: Hausman Test for Time Period Random Effects Model 
 
 
Test Summary Chi-Squared Statistic Chi-Squared d.f. Probability 
Period Random 0.923465 3 0.8198 
 
 
To test if the Period Random Effects model is well specified, we run a Hauseman test for the random 
effects being uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. According to the P-Value (0.8198) of the chi-
square test, we accept the null hypothesis that the model is well-specified. 
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Appendix A_6:  Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
 
Correlation Matrix clearly shows that none of the explanatory variables’ coefficients is higher than ± 0.8. 
Coefficients that are higher than ± 0.8 indicate a near multicollinearity problem, while those that are equal to 1 
indicate perfect multicollinearity problem. According to this table, there is no Multicollinearity problem 
between the explanatory variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit to GDP C. Tax Rate Div. Payout GDP Growth Inf. Rate Int. Rate SEK/EUR SEK/USD Prof. Ratio Stock Perf.
1. Credit to GDP 1.0000
2. Corporate Tax Rate 0.2735 1.0000
3. Div. Payout Ratio 0.0073 0.0306 1.0000
4. GDP Growth Rate -0.2656 0.2507 0.0021 1.0000
5. Inflation Rate 0.0471 -0.1318 0.0528 0.2260 1.0000
6. Interest Rate -0.4450 -0.3873 0.0483 -0.1946 0.6026 1.0000
7. SEK/EUR Rate 0.2624 0.1366 -0.0264 -0.4371 -0.4714 -0.4154 1.0000
8. SEK/USD Rate -0.5139 -0.5740 -0.0368 -0.0483 -0.1898 0.0511 0.2407 1.0000
9. Profitability Ratio -0.0321 0.0107 -0.0156 -0.0061 0.0058 0.0312 -0.0076 6.14E-05 1.0000
10. Stock Perf. Ratio 0.1641 0.0400 -0.0528 -0.1025 0.0412 -0.030359 0.1287 -0.0863 0.0104 1.0000
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Appendix A_7: BPG Heteroscedasticity Test 
 
 
 
 
In order to see if the variances of the residual values are constant we choose to run the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
(BPG) test. The results show a statistically insignificant p-value (0.5347) at the 5% significance level. 
Therefore, we can accept the null hypothesis that the disturbance terms are homoscedastic. The Data has no 
Heteroscedasticity problems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Coefficient Probability 
C -1.905023 0.3476 
Bank Credit as % to GDP 0.589046 0.4046 
Corporate Tax Rate 1.098625 0.8408 
Dividend Payout Ratio -0.001302 0.7806 
GDP Growth Rate -0.029995 0.9939 
Inflation Rate -11.21028 0.3017 
Interest Rate 15.28547 0.3044 
Krona/Euro Exchange Rate 0.085496 0.5332 
Krona/USD Exchange Rate 0.019205 0.8632 
Profitability Ratio -0.043665 0.6281 
Stock Price Performance 1.076297 0.1605 
R-Squared   0.010225 
Probability (F-Statistic)   0.534725 
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Table 1. Industry Classification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total Initial Sample (OMX Stockholm)* 288 
     Excluded Companies 
 Financial Industry 53 
Banks 6 
Financial Services (Sector) 22 
Non-Equity Investment Instruments 1 
Real Estate Investment & Services 24 
Errors 2 
Total Number of Excluded Companies 55 
    Sample Companies by Industry Name 
 Basic Material 20 
Consumer Goods 31 
Consumer Service 25 
Health Care 32 
Industrials 76 
Oil & Gas 7 
Technology 33 
Telecommunication 7 
Utilities 2 
Total Number of Sample Companies 233 
*OMX Stockholm (OMXS) 
 Mnemonic LSWEALI 
Market Sweden 
Currency Swedish Krona 
Source Nasdaq OMX 
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Table 2. Names of the Excluded Financial Industry Firms 
       
Banks Non-equity Investment Instruments 
NORDEA BANK FENIX OUTDOOR INTL 
SEB 'A' 
 SEB 'C' 
SVENSKA HANDBKN.'A' Real Estate Investment & Services 
SVENSKA HANDBKN.'B' ATRIUM LJUNGBERG 'B' 
SWEDBANK 'A' BESQAB PROJEKT & FASTIGH 
Financial Services (Sector) CASTELLUM 
AVANZA BANK HOLDING CATENA 
BURE EQUITY COREM PROPERTY GROUP 
EAST CAPITAL EXPLORER DIOS FASTIGHETER 
INDUSTRIVARDEN 'A' FABEGE 
INDUSTRIVARDEN 'C' FAST PARTNER 
INTRUM JUSTITIA FASTIGHETS BALDER 'B' 
INVESTOR 'A' HEBA 'B' 
INVESTOR 'B' HEMFOSA FASTIGHETER 
KINNEVIK 'A' HUFVUDSTADEN 'A' 
KINNEVIK 'B' HUFVUDSTADEN 'C' 
LATOUR INVESTMENT 'B' JM 
LUNDBERGFORETAGEN 'B' KLOVERN 
MELKER SCHORLING KUNGSLEDEN 
MIDWAY HOLDINGS 'A' PLATZER FASTIGHETER 
MIDWAY HOLDINGS 'B' SAGAX 
NORDNET 'B' SAGAX 'B' 
NOVESTRA TRIBONA 
 
RATOS 'A' VICTORIA PARK 
 
RATOS 'B' VICTORIA PARK B 
TRACTION 'B' WALLENSTAM 'B' 
VOSTOK NAFTA INV.SDR WIHLBORGS FASTIGHETER 
ORESUND INVESTMENT 
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Table 3. Variables description 
 
Dependent Variables Description 
Debt to Equity Ratio of Book Value of Debt over Common Equity 
Debt to Total Capital Ratio of Book Value of Debt over Capital (Total Debt + Equity) 
Debt to Assets Ratio of Book Value of Debt over Total Assets 
   
Independent Variables  
GDP Growth Ratio GDP Growth Rate (annual data) 
Inflation Rate Official Rate of Inflation 
 
Interest Rate 
The discount rate is a reference rate based on market interest rates and always 
follows general interest rates. It is based on the average of 6-monthly and 5-
yearly rates (fixing) over the past quarter with a haircut of 2.5 percentage 
points. 
Corporate Tax Rate   
Exchange Rate SEK-USD and SEK-EUR exchange rates 
Bank Credit as % of GDP Credit to private non-financial sector from domestic banks as % of GDP 
Profitability Ratio Operating Profit over Revenue 
Dividend Payout Ratio Common and preferred dividends paid to shareholders over Net Income 
Stock Price Performance A measure of stock's average annual price movement to a high and low from a 
mean price for each year.  
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Table 4. Results of the Random effects models  
 
Explanatory Variable 
Total   
Debt/Equity 
Long Term 
Debt/Equity 
Short Term 
Debt/Equity 
Total Debt/ 
Capital 
Total 
Debt/Assets 
GDP Growth Ratio 
1.511533 
(0.0982) 
-20.27005 
(0.1338) 
1.090311 
(0.7843) 
0.789174 
(0.0782) 
0.635797 
(0.0637) 
      
Inflation Rate 
-7.215562 
(0.0066) 
74.72598 
(0.0477) 
-2.763586 
(0.8022) 
-2.826287 
(0.0233) 
-2.400263 
(0.0119) 
 
     
Interest Rate 
13.72516 
(0.0002) 
-89.09459 
(0.0838) 
0.429179 
(0.9774) 
6.118587 
(0.0004) 
4.508903 
(0.0006) 
 
     
Corporate Tax Rate 
-1.029308 
(0.4439) 
1.228742 
(0.9478) 
-1.057834 
(0.8498) 
-0.214009 
(0.7339) 
-0.141143 
(0.7695) 
 
     
Exch. Rate SEK/EUR 
0.007023 
(0.8355) 
-0.229924 
(0.6280) 
0.211285 
(0.1318) 
-0.003526 
(0.8230) 
-0.006524 
(0.5885) 
 
     
Exch. Rate SEK/USD 
0.023191 
(0.3903) 
-0.086759 
(0.8195) 
-0.031290 
(0.7844) 
0.013272 
(0.3005) 
0.013033 
(0.1840) 
 
     
Bank Credit as % of GDP 
0.487123 
(0.0057) 
-2.294341 
(0.3468) 
0.064158 
(0.9293) 
0.210087 
(0.0098) 
0.189616 
(0.0023) 
 
     
Profitability Ratio 
-0.000518 
(0.9868) 
0.213181 
(0.4936) 
-0.864582 
(0.0020) 
0.028968 
(0.0053) 
0.020705 
(0.0092) 
      
Divident Payout Ratio 
-0.0000163 
(0.9895) 
-0.001334 
(0.9346) 
-0.000625 
(0.8949) 
-0.000205 
(0.7034) 
-9.09E-05 
(0.8252) 
      
Stock Price Performance 
0.683815 
(0.0276) 
0.932779 
(0.7209) 
0.426136 
(0.5930) 
0.213823 
(0.0152) 
0.186500 
(0.0057) 
 
     
Hauseman Test 18.0823 8.6724 3.041234 1.0622 1.0388 
P-Value (0.0536) (0.5634) (0.9804) (0.7862) (0.7918) 
 
The Table reports the primary results of the regression analysis. The first three columns report the results for the 
Cross-Section Random Effects model, while the last two for the Period Random Effects model. Our main 
Leverage measure is Total Debt to Equity Ratio and the other leverage measures are used for comparison 
reasons with the Total Debt to Equity Ratio. The P-Values are reported, in italic, under the estimated 
coefficients. 
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Table 5. Summary of Selected Studies 
 
Explanatory Variable 
Debt to 
Equity 
Ratio 
Positive Relation with 
Leverage 
Negative Relation 
with Leverage 
No Relation 
with Leverage 
GDP Growth Ratio 
1.511533 Booth et al. (2001), Stulz 
(1990), Miller (1977)  
Bokpin (2009), 
Dincergok & 
Yalciner (2011), 
Gajurel (2005)  
  
(0.0982)  
Inflation Rate 
-7.215562 Sett & Sarkhel (2010), 
Hanousek & Shamshur 
(2011)  
Gajurel (2006) 
Bastos, 
Nakamura & 
Basso (2009), 
Frank & Goyal 
(2009) 
(0.0066) 
Interest Rate 
13.72516 
Bokpin (2009) 
Dincergok & 
Yalciner (2011) 
  
(0.0002) 
Corporate Tax Rate 
-1.029308 
    Myers (2003) 
(0.4439) 
Exchange Rate: 
SEK/EUR 
0.007023 
(0.8355) 
      
Exchange Rate: 
SEK/USD 
0.023191 
(0.3903) 
Bank Credit as % of 
GDP 
0.487123 
      
(0.0057) 
Profitability Ratio 
-0.000518 Blazenko (1987), Jensen 
(1986), Hovakimian 
(2004) 
De Jong and Veld 
(2001), Flannery and 
Rangan (2006), Rajan 
and Zingales (1995), 
Titman and Wessels 
(1998) 
  
(0.9868) 
Dividend Payout Ratio 
-0.0000163 Chang and Rhee (1990), 
Baskin (1989), Allen 
(1993) 
Rozeff (1982), 
Mackie-Manson 
(1990), Asgharian 
(1997) 
  
(0.9895)  
Stock Price Perfomance 
0.683815 
  
Asgharian (1997), 
Dimitrov and Jain 
(2008)  
  
(0.0276) 
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics for Macroeconomic Variables 
 
 
Macroeconomic Variables 
  
GDP 
Growth 
Rate 
Inflation 
Rate 
Interest 
Rate 
Corporate 
Tax Rate 
Exchange 
Rate 
SEK/EUR 
Exchange 
Rate 
SEK/USD 
Bank Credit as 
% of GDP 
Mean 0.0224 0.0151 0.0233 27.3818 9.4089 7.5404 1.0618 
Median 0.0300 0.0140 0.0200 28.0000 9.1438 7.1401 1.0491 
St. Dev. 0.0298 0.0117 0.0110 0.8577 0.6471 1.1928 0.2125 
Min. -0.0498 -0.0050 0.0050 26.3000 8.8993 6.4632 0.7993 
Max. 0.0628 0.0340 0.0425 28.0000 10.9925 10.4897 1.3318 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the macroeconomic variables used in the thesis. The content is the 
summary for annual data collected for the years 2002-2012. 
 
Table 7. Descriptive Statistics for Firm-specific and Leverage Ratios 
 
 
Firm Specific Variables Leverage Ratios 
 
Profitability 
Ratio 
Stock 
Performance 
Ratio 
Dividend 
Payout 
Ratio 
Debt to 
Equity 
Ratio 
Debt to 
Capital 
Ratio 
Debt to 
Assets Ratio 
Mean -0.0124 0.3430 0.1919 0.5774 0.3254 0.2244 
Median 0.0574 0.3208 0.0549 0.4590 0.3165 0.2010 
St. Dev. 0.4035 0.1151 0.3350 0.5026 0.2173 0.1611 
Min -4.7630 0.1388 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Max 0.8027 0.7967 1.9456 3.3245 1.9072 1.0284 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the firm specific variables and leverage ratios used in our study. The 
content includes the summary for annual data selected for 233 firms listed on OMX Stockholm. As it is mentioned 
above, the sample period is from 2002-2012.  
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Table 8. Descriptive Stat. for Debt to Common Equity Ratio by Industries 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Mean 0.65 0.63 0.56 0.51 0.55 0.86 0.97 4.83 0.69 0.73 0.87
Meadian 0.39 0.39 0.56 0.36 0.35 0.73 0.94 0.46 0.66 0.68 0.65
St. Dev 0.63 0.57 0.37 0.36 0.43 0.48 0.94 17.24 0.53 0.52 0.99
Min. 0.00 0.03 0.15 0.12 0.08 0.35 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.08
Max. 2.13 1.68 1.44 1.24 1.28 1.56 4.12 69.47 1.97 1.85 4.33
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Mean 0.70 0.71 0.65 0.91 0.76 0.73 0.78 0.51 0.45 0.51 0.54
Meadian 0.56 0.65 0.71 0.65 0.49 0.63 0.74 0.52 0.46 0.50 0.56
St. Dev 0.33 0.34 0.28 0.85 0.72 0.62 0.58 0.31 0.24 0.25 0.26
Min. 0.22 0.06 0.03 0.29 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03
Max. 1.37 1.34 1.11 3.32 3.60 1.84 2.23 1.20 1.00 0.98 0.98
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Mean 0.78 0.94 0.78 0.66 0.47 0.64 0.70 0.57 0.53 0.50 0.50
Meadian 0.88 0.63 0.58 0.46 0.25 0.35 0.65 0.60 0.46 0.38 0.22
St. Dev 0.52 0.62 0.64 0.67 0.49 0.79 0.58 0.44 0.51 0.47 0.54
Min. 0.00 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01
Max. 1.95 2.19 2.44 2.37 1.82 2.67 2.29 1.46 1.95 1.47 1.86
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Mean 0.40 0.29 0.34 0.37 0.43 0.46 0.50 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.47
Meadian 0.19 0.07 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.27 0.26 0.30 0.27 0.44
St. Dev 0.53 0.49 0.40 0.47 0.54 0.54 0.49 0.46 0.42 0.45 0.37
Min. 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
Max. 1.84 1.77 1.24 1.59 2.01 1.46 1.58 1.35 1.37 1.47 1.16
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Mean 0.71 0.76 0.65 0.62 0.57 0.74 0.78 0.75 0.70 0.71 0.81
Meadian 0.62 0.59 0.51 0.49 0.42 0.61 0.79 0.68 0.63 0.57 0.61
St. Dev 0.63 0.69 0.57 0.56 0.45 0.54 0.56 0.68 0.68 0.66 0.64
Min. 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00
Max. 3.06 3.56 2.74 2.66 1.88 2.26 2.52 3.70 3.65 3.53 3.86
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Mean 0.54 0.47 0.35 0.60 0.63 0.51 0.44 0.37 0.36 0.52 0.52
Meadian 0.44 0.47 0.35 0.20 0.83 0.51 0.38 0.32 0.30 0.21 0.32
St. Dev 0.58 0.66 0.30 0.77 0.40 0.31 0.28 0.37 0.38 0.62 0.68
Min. 0.01 0.00 0.14 0.11 0.16 0.29 0.20 0.03 0.01 0.12 0.04
Max. 1.16 0.94 0.56 1.49 0.88 0.73 0.75 0.83 0.84 1.23 1.69
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Mean 0.30 0.47 0.23 0.41 0.31 0.23 0.26 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.27
Meadian 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.09 0.17
St. Dev 0.44 0.79 0.28 0.68 0.46 0.28 0.32 0.20 0.18 0.23 0.27
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max. 1.46 2.43 0.89 2.53 1.90 1.14 1.44 0.87 0.74 1.02 0.87
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Mean 0.47 0.42 0.54 0.51 0.58 0.50 0.51 0.40 0.35 0.62 0.93
Meadian 0.41 0.27 0.20 0.45 0.69 0.37 0.50 0.53 0.51 0.64 0.81
St. Dev 0.13 0.26 0.89 0.37 0.24 0.22 0.38 0.34 0.29 0.28 0.33
Min. 0.36 0.24 0.16 0.21 0.23 0.37 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.14 0.72
Max. 0.63 0.76 2.55 1.30 0.80 0.96 1.29 0.98 0.76 1.08 1.61
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Mean 0.53 0.50 0.34 0.43 0.36 0.29 0.59 0.46 0.37 0.76 0.84
Meadian 0.53 0.50 0.34 0.43 0.36 0.29 0.59 0.46 0.37 0.76 0.84
St. Dev 0.17 0.13 0.39 0.06 0.20 0.35 0.26 0.59 0.43 0.53 0.88
Min. 0.41 0.41 0.07 0.38 0.22 0.05 0.41 0.04 0.07 0.38 0.22
Max. 0.65 0.60 0.62 0.48 0.50 0.54 0.78 0.88 0.67 1.14 1.47
Debt to Common Equity
Basic Material
Debt to Common Equity
Consumer Goods
Debt to Common Equity
Consumer Service
Debt to Common Equity
Health Care
Debt to Common Equity
Industrials
Oil & Gas
Debt to Common Equity
Utilities
Debt to Common Equity
Technology
Debt to Common Equity
Telecommunication
Debt to Common Equity
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Table 9. Descriptive Statistics for Debt to Total Capital Ratio by Industries 
 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Mean 0.37 0.37 0.33 0.31 0.30 0.39 0.40 0.38 0.32 0.31 0.35
Meadian 0.34 0.30 0.36 0.28 0.24 0.34 0.37 0.32 0.29 0.27 0.32
St. Dev 0.16 0.18 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.20 0.16 0.18 0.20
Min. 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.18 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.00
Max. 0.67 0.63 0.59 0.59 0.56 0.63 0.80 0.99 0.55 0.65 0.81
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Mean 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.30 0.32 0.35 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.35
Meadian 0.34 0.39 0.41 0.31 0.26 0.29 0.23 0.27 0.30 0.28 0.38
St. Dev 0.29 0.27 0.26 0.31 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.20
Min. 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01
Max. 1.01 0.92 0.92 1.23 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.93
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Mean 0.27 0.23 0.23 0.26 0.29 0.40 0.44 0.38 0.31 0.33 0.33
Meadian 0.31 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.26 0.41 0.45 0.39 0.34 0.28 0.37
St. Dev 0.23 0.20 0.19 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.24 0.28 0.23 0.23 0.25
Min. 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
Max. 0.63 0.64 0.67 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.87 0.97 0.89 0.88 0.88
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Mean 0.34 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.37 0.34 0.31 0.32 0.35
Meadian 0.35 0.28 0.29 0.24 0.27 0.27 0.37 0.37 0.29 0.29 0.34
St. Dev 0.28 0.31 0.21 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.23 0.25
Min. 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
Max. 0.75 1.17 0.70 0.67 0.86 0.73 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.75 0.90
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Mean 0.36 0.39 0.39 0.36 0.34 0.37 0.41 0.36 0.34 0.36 0.39
Meadian 0.38 0.37 0.39 0.32 0.30 0.31 0.43 0.37 0.36 0.38 0.37
St. Dev 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.30 0.24 0.25 0.22 0.19
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01
Max. 0.91 0.91 0.97 0.93 0.93 0.93 1.91 0.90 0.97 0.89 0.89
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Mean 0.14 0.16 0.22 0.29 0.26 0.53 0.34 0.29 0.24 0.36 0.30
Meadian 0.02 0.04 0.18 0.38 0.28 0.43 0.32 0.28 0.28 0.35 0.33
St. Dev 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.18 0.11 0.08
Min. 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.34 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.25 0.18
Max. 0.38 0.41 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.82 0.76 0.72 0.45 0.50 0.36
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Mean 0.30 0.34 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.27 0.26 0.20 0.28 0.28 0.30
Meadian 0.26 0.37 0.25 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.16 0.14 0.23 0.24 0.24
St. Dev 0.22 0.26 0.24 0.25 0.22 0.23 0.25 0.20 0.25 0.25 0.24
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max. 0.76 0.78 0.73 0.73 0.66 0.72 0.82 0.67 0.91 0.99 1.04
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Mean 0.31 0.18 0.19 0.40 0.24 0.30 0.32 0.20 0.24 0.22 0.40
Meadian 0.28 0.19 0.16 0.31 0.18 0.25 0.32 0.12 0.27 0.33 0.42
St. Dev 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.29 0.15 0.29 0.20 0.17 0.12 0.20 0.31
Min. 0.26 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.12 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.01
Max. 0.38 0.21 0.27 0.72 0.40 0.78 0.59 0.43 0.33 0.39 0.99
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Mean 0.68 0.63 0.65 0.50 0.53 0.57 0.55 0.56 0.50 0.56 0.60
Meadian 0.68 0.63 0.65 0.50 0.53 0.57 0.55 0.56 0.50 0.56 0.60
St. Dev 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.16 0.13 0.14 0.04 0.01
Min. 0.65 0.60 0.62 0.48 0.50 0.54 0.44 0.47 0.40 0.53 0.59
Max. 0.70 0.65 0.68 0.53 0.55 0.60 0.66 0.66 0.60 0.58 0.61
Debt To Total Capital
Basic Material
Debt To Total Capital
Consumer Goods
Debt To Total Capital
Consumer Service
Debt To Total Capital
Health Care
Debt To Total Capital
Industrials
Oil & Gas
Debt To Total Capital
Utilities
Debt To Total Capital
Technology
Debt To Total Capital
Telecommunication
Debt To Total Capital
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Table 10. Descriptive Statistics for Debt to Total Assets Ratio by Industries 
 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Mean 0.26 0.26 0.22 0.18 0.20 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.23 0.22 0.26
Meadian 0.23 0.21 0.24 0.18 0.18 0.25 0.28 0.22 0.19 0.18 0.19
St. Dev 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.18
Min. 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.00
Max. 0.53 0.52 0.39 0.33 0.42 0.50 0.56 0.72 0.53 0.61 0.77
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Mean 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.24
Meadian 0.26 0.28 0.26 0.20 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.25
St. Dev 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.14
Min. 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Max. 0.69 0.66 0.73 0.76 0.57 0.57 0.62 0.63 0.59 0.67 0.57
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Mean 0.16 0.13 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.26 0.28 0.25 0.20 0.21 0.20
Meadian 0.18 0.09 0.14 0.10 0.10 0.28 0.29 0.25 0.20 0.19 0.20
St. Dev 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.16
Min. 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
Max. 0.39 0.35 0.45 0.66 0.54 0.50 0.56 0.53 0.49 0.47 0.60
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Mean 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.28 0.27 0.24 0.25 0.28
Meadian 0.27 0.22 0.24 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.25 0.24 0.21 0.20 0.27
St. Dev 0.22 0.23 0.15 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.23
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
Max. 0.66 0.82 0.59 0.68 0.78 0.64 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.67 1.00
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Mean 0.23 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.28 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.27
Meadian 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.19 0.18 0.21 0.26 0.27 0.24 0.23 0.25
St. Dev 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.15
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Max. 0.69 0.68 0.75 0.77 0.70 0.68 1.01 0.74 0.67 0.68 0.65
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Mean 0.09 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.18 0.37 0.24 0.20 0.16 0.22 0.18
Meadian 0.02 0.03 0.13 0.26 0.19 0.28 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.22 0.19
St. Dev 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.22 0.19 0.20 0.12 0.05 0.06
Min. 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.20 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.15 0.10
Max. 0.26 0.25 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.61 0.56 0.51 0.32 0.27 0.23
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Mean 0.21 0.25 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.21 0.22 0.23
Meadian 0.19 0.28 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.12 0.09 0.16 0.16 0.18
St. Dev 0.17 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.16 0.20 0.21 0.20
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max. 0.71 0.74 0.72 0.67 0.54 0.64 0.68 0.62 0.78 0.88 0.90
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Mean 0.19 0.13 0.12 0.24 0.17 0.21 0.21 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.31
Meadian 0.23 0.16 0.12 0.25 0.15 0.21 0.25 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.28
St. Dev 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.10 0.15 0.22 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.16 0.27
Min. 0.11 0.05 0.11 0.14 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00
Max. 0.23 0.17 0.14 0.34 0.32 0.58 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.32 0.84
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Mean 0.65 0.60 0.62 0.48 0.50 0.54 0.49 0.54 0.48 0.52 0.54
Meadian 0.65 0.60 0.62 0.48 0.50 0.54 0.49 0.54 0.48 0.52 0.54
St. Dev 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.12 0.12 0.03 0.00
Min. 0.65 0.60 0.62 0.48 0.50 0.54 0.36 0.45 0.39 0.50 0.54
Max. 0.65 0.60 0.62 0.48 0.50 0.54 0.62 0.62 0.57 0.55 0.54
Debt to Total Assets
Basic Material
Debt to Total Assets
Consumer Goods
Debt to Total Assets
Consumer Service
Debt to Total Assets
Health Care
Debt to Total Assets
Industrials
Oil & Gas
Debt to Total Assets
Utilities
Debt to Total Assets
Technology
Debt to Total Assets
Telecommunication
Debt to Total Assets
